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ABSTRACT
Good faith plays a central role in most legal systems, yet appears to be an
intractable concept. This article proposes to analyse it economically as the
absence of opportunism in circumstances which lend themselves to it. One of the
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objectives underlying the law of contract on an economic view is to curtail
opportunism. In spelling out what this means, the paper proposes a three-step
test: bad faith is present where a substantial informational or other asymmetry
exists between the parties, which one of them turns into an undue advantage,
considered against the gains both parties could normally expect to realise
through the contract, and where loss to the disadvantaged party is so serious as
to provoke recourse to expensive self-protection, which significantly raises
transactions costs in the market. The three-step test is then used to analyse a
set of recent decisions in international commercial transactions and three
concepts derived from good faith: fraud, warranty for latent defects and lesion.
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INTRODUCTION
Good faith is a key principle in modern legal systems, in common law as
well as in civil law. 4. It played a major role in late Roman law and in pre-
codification French law.5 Within the modern civil law family, it still plays an
important role in modern French law6 and a central role in modern German civil
law (‘Treu und Glauben’).7 In Dutch law, the recodification towards the end of the
twentieth century recognised as fundamental principles of civil law the subjective
notion of good faith as justifiable ignorance in the law of property, and the
objective notion of good faith as loyalty in contractual dealings, for which the new
term ‘reasonableness and equity’ (redelijkheid en billijkheid) was introduced.8
                                                 
4 Litvinoff, (1997), for a wider survey and a study of attempts to capture the essence of the
concept. The reference to the Netherlands Civil Code at nt 53 is inaccurate, since the
preliminary title, of which art. 6 was to be part, has been abandoned. See New Netherlands
Civil Code - Patrimonial Law / Le nouveau Code civil néerlandais - Le droit patrimonial
(trilingual edition) (translated by P.P.C. Haanappel and E. Mackaay) Kluwer, Deventer, The
Netherlands and Boston, MA 1990; Netherlands Business Legislation, translated by Peter
Haanappel, Ejan Mackaay, Hans Warendorf and Richard Thomas, The Hague, Kluwer Law
International, 1999.
5 Charpentier (1996).
6 Arts 1134 and 1135 French Civil Code, in particular.
7 Art. 242 BGB.
8 The New Netherlands Civil Code is being adopted and put in force in stages. See New
Netherlands Civil Code - Patrimonial Law / Le nouveau Code civil néerlandais - Le droit
patrimonial (trilingual edition) (translated by P.P.C. Haanappel and E. Mackaay) Kluwer,
Deventer, Netherlands and Boston, Mass., 1990; New Netherlands Civil Code - Patrimonial
Law / Le nouveau Code civil néerlandais - Book 8 - Traffic Means and Transport/ Livre
huitième - Du transport et des moyens de transport (trilingual edition) (translated by P.P.C.
Haanappel and E. Mackaay), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1995; Netherlands
Business Legislation, translated by Peter Haanappel, Ejan Mackaay, Hans Warendorf and
Richard Thomas, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999.
Articles 2, 248 and 258 of Book 6 (Obligations) contain the key provisions:
Article 6:2
1. A creditor and debtor must, as between themselves, act in accordance
with the requirements of reasonableness and equity.
2. A rule binding upon them by virtue of law, usage or a juridical act does
not apply to the extent that, in the given circumstances, this would be
unacceptable according to criteria of reasonableness and equity..
Article 6:248
1. A contract has not only the juridical effects agreed to by the parties, but
also those which, according to the nature of the contract, result from
the law, usage or the requirements of reasonableness and equity.
2. A rule binding upon the parties as a result of the contract does not
apply to the extent that, in the given circumstances, this would be
unacceptable according to criteria of reasonableness and equity.
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The Quebec Civil Code of 1994 has given good faith a substantially larger place
than it had under the old Code of 1866. In all, 86 articles in the new code use the
term good faith.9 The Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts of
1994 provide in art. 1.7 that each contracting party must act ‘in accordance with
good faith and fair dealing in international trade’.10 A broad survey by Litvinoff of
a range of national legal systems shows how widely the notion of good faith is
used.11
There is agreement amongst scholars that the law of contracts must ensure
that contractual arrangements generally conform to the requirements of good
faith. But opinions diverge on how this should be accomplished. For some, good
faith must be articulated as a general rule or an abstract principle; for others,
good faith is better pursued, without necessarily using the term, through a myriad
of particular institutions designed to ensure its presence in specific cases; the
concept itself would merely serve as a moral standard. Civil law systems tend
towards the former position, common law towards the latter. The division is,
however, rather fuzzy. In the common law world, whilst English law remains
                                                                                                                                                  
Article 6:258
1. Upon the demand of one of the parties, the judge may modify the
effects of a contract, or he may set it aside in whole or in part on the
basis of unforeseen circumstances which are of such a nature that the
cocontracting party, according to criteria of reasonableness and equity,
may not expect that the contract be maintained in an unmodified form.
The modification or the setting aside of the contract may be given
retroactive force.
2. The modification or the setting aside of the contract is not pronounced
to the extent that the person invoking the circumstances should be
accountable for them according to the nature of the contract or
common opinion.
3. For the purposes of this article, a person to whom a contractual right or
obligation has been transferred, is assimilated to a contracting party.
9 Key provisions are 6 and 7, at the beginning of the Code, and 1375, in the law of
obligations.
6. Every person is bound to exercise his civil rights in good faith.
7. No right may be exercised with the intent of injuring another or in an excessive and
unreasonable manner which is contrary to the requirements of good faith.
1375. The parties shall conduct themselves in good faith both at the time the obligation
is created and at the time it is performed or extinguished.
The text of the Civil Code of Quebec (CCQ) may be found and searched at
http://www.canlii.org/qc/sta/csqc/20030530/c.c.q./.
10 Art 1.7
(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international trade.
(2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty.
English text at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/unidroit.contract.principles.1994/doc.html; French at
http://www.unidroit.org/french/principles/contents.htm. For a comparison between Unidroit
principles and the Quebec Code, see Crépeau and Charpentier, (1998).
11 Litvinoff, (1997).
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opposed to explicit recognition,12 American law has expressly adopted good faith
in the Uniform Commercial Code and in the Restatement of Contracts, 2nd.13
Both documents have inspired various state legislatures to adopt good faith in
their statutes. Amongst civil law systems, good faith plays a key role in systems
based on the German model, a somewhat lesser role in those following the
French tradition.
It is our thesis that there is a common foundation – a common core, a deep
structure – underlying the various uses of good faith in contract and that it can be
traced with the tools of the economic analysis of law. Moreover, we expect the
elements composing this common foundation to find expression in decisions
which invoke good faith, or at least in the best motivated amongst them, without
the deciding authority necessarily articulating them. This proposition is testable.
We test them on a small set of decisions dealing with international commercial
transactions. Furthermore, legal scholarship has established that even in civil law
systems, good faith requirements have crystallised into a number of more
specific institutions, such as fraud and mistake as defects of consent, latent
defects in sale, duties of loyalty and co-operation in the law of mandate
(agency).14 If this is true, it should be possible to trace the elements composing
the common foundation of good faith in the cases and the scholarship which
have worked out these concepts into more specific rules for these derivative
concepts. This proposition as well lends itself to testing.
In what follows we deal only with contractual good faith, leaving aside good
faith in property law, where it applies, for instance, to the purchaser of stolen
goods and to the possessor non-owner of goods who acquires ownership
through prescription.15 Good faith refers here to justifiable ignorance of facts or
legal status. This notion, too, lends itself to an economic analysis, in which one
compares the precautions that could have been taken to ascertain the accurate
state of affairs to the risk and cost of acting on an erroneous assessment.16
The structure of the article is as follows. We first look briefly at what insights
can be drawn from traditional legal scholarship on good faith, then set forth an
economic conception of it. In the second part, proceed to test it on a set of
                                                 
12 For example, Waddams (1991), at 256 ; O’Connor (1990), at 48 ; Teubner (1998); in
support of good faith, see Stapleton (1999); Collins (1999).
13 See Farnsworth, (1994) at 52.
14 For instance Cordeiro (1996), at 240 ; Schoordijk (2003), at 42 (translation) : ‘Good faith
constitues both in Germany and in the Netherlands the driving force behind the creation of
new law ..’.
15 Examples in the Quebec Civil Code: 932, 958 (possessor in good faith entitled to
reimbursement of expenses made to property being reclaimed by its owner; has a
rentention right for the reimbursement); 1559 (payment in good faith to the apparent creditor
is valid); 1714 (reimbursement of price to purchaser in good faith of a stolen object); 2163
(principal bound towards third persons who relied in good faith on the appearance of a
mandate). Several articles propose an analysis of rules regarding the protection of the good
faith purchaser of stolen goods: Weinberg, (1980); Levmore, (1987).
16 See Mackaay (2001), at 31.
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decisions in international sales and against more specific legal concepts derived
from good faith.
I. THEORY
1. A brief survey of legal scholarship
Whatever the precise role assigned to good faith, it is important to be clear
about what the term means. In a survey of scholarly writing on the subject, good
faith emerges as a fuzzy concept.17 As for English law, in the conclusion of a
recent study, for instance, good faith is characterised as ‘a fundamental principle
derived from the rule pacta sunt servanda, and other legal rules, distinctively and
directly related to honesty, fairness and reasonableness, the application of which
is determined at a particular time by the standards of honesty, fairness and
reasonableness prevailing in the community which are considered appropriate
for formulation in new or revised legal rules.’ 18 You recognise bad faith, or the
absence of good faith, when you see it, but would be hard pressed to spell out
criteria for its application.
Civilian scholarship is not much more helpful when it comes to
characterising the concept. It tends to see good faith as a general principle of
civil law. By general principle, it means ‘a general rule whose contents are fuzzy
and whose role it is to federate a number of other rules’, which are its concrete
applications.19 It is not difficult to discern a host of applications of good faith
which the courts would have to develop further: the duty to negotiate in good
faith, the duty of trust and secrecy in contractual negotiations, the obligation of
loyalty in the performance of a contract, the duty to inform before and during the
life of the contract; the duty to cooperate with one’s contracting partner to allow
the satisfactory performance of the contract.20
In Quebec law, to take this system as an example, the new Code provides
for a central role of good faith by three general provisions mentioned above.21
Several important Supreme Court decisions on sharp dealings by banks
underscore this role.22 Numerous applications of good faith may be found in the
particular provisions of the Code: a duty to co-operate is a defining characteristic
of partnership (art. 2186 CCQ); a duty for employees and agents to act faithfully
                                                 
17 Litvinoff (1997), at 1663 ff. Hesselink (1998), at 288-89, summarises his survey as follows:
“Good faith is said to be a norm, a (very important) principle, a rule, a maxim, a duty, a rule
or standard for conduct, a source of unwritten law, a general clause. To an English lawyer –
often accused by his continental European colleagues of making inconsistent use of
terminology – this may seem rather confusing.”
18 O'Connor (1990), at 102.
19 Jaluzot (2001), at 187, no 687.
20 For a more detailed list: Whittaker/Zimmerman (2000), at 676.
21 Arts 6, 7, 1375. See also Jobin (2000).
22 Banque nationale du Canada c. Soucisse, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 339; Houle c. Banque nationale
du Canada, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122; Banque de Montréal c. Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 554.
These decisions may be found at http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/index.html .
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and honestly (art. 2088, 2138, 1309, 2238 CCQ); a duty of the agent to
cooperate with the principal in the pursuit of the purpose of the mandate (art.
2149 CCQ) and to avoid a conflict with the interests of the principal (art. 2138
CCQ); in matters of fraud, silence may be equated with lies (art. 1401, par. 1
CCQ).
But what to make of the concept of good faith itself? One may grant to
Ripert the thesis that good faith tend to moralise civil law,23 but this scarcely
suffices to operationalise the concept. Focusing more particularly on international
transactions, Marquis summarises his survey of scholarship on good faith in
these terms:
« Les idées mises de l’avant dans la recherche du sens de la
bonne foi prennent à peu près l’allure des exemples suivants, qui
concernent l’article 7 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur les
contrats de vente internationale de marchandises. Pour un, V.
Heuzé comprend la bonne foi "comme une invitation à introduire
une certaine souplesse dans l’application des règles
conventionnelles, un peu à la manière de ce qu’autorise, en droit
français, la théorie de l’abus de droit". B. Audit voit dans la bonne
foi un principe particulièrement pertinent dans le cas de
déséquilibre contractuel. M.J. Bonell favorise une interprétation dite
large de la bonne foi, élaborée "in the light of the special conditions
and requirements of international trade". De leur côté, F. Enderlain
et D. Maskow réservent un rôle restreint à la bonne foi. Selon ces
derniers, “observance of the principle of good faith means to
display such conduct as is normal among businessmen”. Ils
ajoutent que “no exaggerated demands can be made, and
observance of good faith does in no way necessarily include the
establishment of material justice between the contracting parties”.
Enfin, G. Flécheux affirme, dans une étude sur les obligations de
l’acheteur, qu’ "il restera toujours l’obligation de bonne foi", laissant
par là sous-entendre qu’il ne s’agit pas là d’un principe
marginal. »24
Popovici, in a recent piece, characterises bad faith dealing essentially as a
faute.25 For the lawyer-economist, it suggests the application of the Hand-test for
negligence, comparing cost of prudence with cost of mishaps, discounted for the
likelihood of their occurrence. This leads, however, to a dead end, since bad faith
actions are designed to provide an advantage for the perpetrator at the expense
of a contract partner.
To further specify the concept, legal scholarship uses terms such as
‘fairness, fair conduct, reasonable standards of fair dealing, decency,
reasonableness, decent behavior, a common ethical sense, a spirit of solidarity,
                                                 
23 Ripert (1949), at 291; Whittaker/Zimmerman (2000), at 677.
24 Marquis (1996).
25 Popovici (2002), at 103.
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community standards of fairness' and 'honesty in fact’’26 and their French
equivalents: ‘loyauté’27, ‘honnêteté’, ‘intégrité’’28 , ‘fidélité’, ‘droiture’, ‘véracité’ 29,
‘comportement loyal’, ‘souci de coopération’, ‘absence de mauvaise volonté’,
‘absence d’intention malveillante’30;; the absence of good faith signals
‘unconscionable’31 behaviour, which in French is characterised as ‘blâmable’,
‘choquant’, ‘déraisonnable’.32 In pre-revolutionary French law, good faith was
considered to require ‘that consent is valid, that parties abstain from trickery,
violence, any dishonesty or fraud; but also that it was plausible and reasonable;
and finally that the contract not be contrary to divine law, to good morals, nor to
the ‘common weal’ (profit commun)’ 33
What constitutes fair dealing may be determined, in particular
circumstances, by applicable by commercial or other practices or usages. The
new Netherlands Civil Code expressly provides, in art. 3:12, that ‘[i]n determining
what reasonableness and equity require, reference must be made to generally
accepted principles of law, to current juridical views in the Netherlands, and to
the particular societal and private interests involved.’34 Lefebvre concludes her
thesis by stating that good faith should be analysed by more objective criteria,
not related solely to the individual, but which also take societal values into
account.’ 35
Jaluzot, in her doctoral thesis, sees in long-term or relational36 contracts a
field where good faith would be eminently applicable: contracts in the civil code
are essentially construed on the model of instantly concluded deals, where the
initial consent has to carry the entire operation throughout its duration. In a
relationship destined to last over time, circumstances may develop such as to
require adjustments along the way; was is needed here is a tool capable of
accomplishing this whilst leaving the original consent standing. ‘Parties should
be bound by the trust they have created, not only by what they explicitly
undertook, but also by their attitude during the life of the contract. This allows
parties to be held liable on the basis of what has happened during the contract
                                                 
26 Keily (1999), at 17-18.
27 Charpentier (1996), at 305.
28 Pineau et al. (2001), at 35.
29 Rolland (1996), at 381.
30 Cornu (2000), Vo Bonne foi.
31 Id., à la p. 17.
32 Id., à la p. 44.
33 Ourliac/de Malafosse (1969), at 83, no 67, quoted by Charpentier (1996), at 316.
34 New Netherlands Civil Code - Patrimonial Law / Le nouveau Code civil néerlandais - Le
droit patrimonial (trilingual edition) (translated by P.P.C. Haanappel and E. Mackaay)
Kluwer, Deventer, The Netherlands and Boston, MA 1990.
35 Lefebvre (1998), at 258.
36 On this term see for instance Macneil (1974); Macneil, (1985); Schanze (1993); Goldberg
(1998).
Mackaay & Leblanc, The economics of good faith in contract 9
and not only at the time it was entered into.’ 37 As regards the contents of good
faith, Jaluzot concludes that in current usage, ‘in fact, good faith has no
objectively determinable content; it can be used to justify any rule in the law of
contracts and indeed outside of it.’ 38
All these formulae, intuitively plausible though one may find them, merely
translate one general term into other general terms. A formula closer to
translation into operational tests is given by Pineau et al.: ‘one should not profit
from the inexperience or vulnerability of other persons to impose on them
draconian terms, to squeeze out advantages which do not correspond to what
one gives them.’39 But even this does not allow us to set out clear criteria for
applying the concept of good faith.
Economic analysis of law has been used as a tool for conceptual analysis
(legal scholarship) as much as for policy analysis. Can it help us shed light of the
concept of good faith?
2. An economic view of good faith
Good faith appears in some law-and-economics scholarship, but only
incidentally. Posner states, for instance, that ‘[g]ood-faith performance–which
means in this context not trying to take advantage of the vulnerabilities created
by the sequential character of contractual performance – is an implied term of
every contract. No one would voluntarily place himself at the mercy of the other
party, so it is reasonable to assume that if the parties had thought about the
possibility of bad faith they would have forbidden it expressly.’40 But the analysis
is not pushed any farther. Major law-and-economics textbooks in the civil law
tradition do not deal with the concept of good faith explicitly.41
To move ahead, it is useful to recall the purposes or missions which the
economic analysis of law detects underlying the law of contracts. There are two.
One is to reduce the various forms of transaction costs, the other to avoid
opportunism.42 Transactions costs are reduced by a variety of rules: by providing
efficient rules where parties have not explicitly contracted – this may reduce
mistakes and litigation; by obliging one party to provide information to the other
in order for the latter to contract with sufficient knowledge of what is at stake; by
allocating the risk for unforeseen circumstances to the party most cheaply able to
assume them; by imposing various arrangements to create documents which
may later be used as evidence should litigation arise. All these costs are
                                                 
37 Jaluzot (1991), at 534 (translation).
38 Id., 539.
39 Pineau et al. (2001), at 44.
40 Posner (2003), at 95 (§ 4.1).
41 For instance Schäfer/Ott (2000); Ogus/Faure (2002); Holzhauer/Teijl (1995); van
Velthoven/van Wijck (2001); Chiancone/Porrini (1997). Even the very extensive
encyclopaedia on law and economics prepared at the University of Ghent does not deal with
it: Bouckaert/De Geest (eds) (2000).
42 For instance Posner (2003), at 98 (§ 4.1).
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technical and may change as a result, amongst other factors, of technological
innovations.
Opportunism or strategic behaviour poses difficulties of a different order. It
is the type of behaviour designated by French expressions such as surprendre la
bonne foi de quelqu’un or abuser de la bonne foi de quelqu’un, for which there
does not appear to be a direct English equivalent. A valid contract must ensure
an expected gain to both parties. One party acts opportunistically in changing,
often sneakily, the course of the contract so as to capture for himself, at the
expense of the other, an advantage not assigned to him by agreement upon
entering into the contract.
In the economic literature one finds discussed various typical forms of
opportunism. Free riding – where a result can be brought about only by the
contribution of all but where it is not feasible to supervise everyone, the free rider
abstains from contributing, yet shares in the spoils – is one form.43 Shirking in a
labour relationship, whereby the employee gives the employer a lesser
performance than promised, is another.44 Supervision difficulties are also at the
root of the agency problems – where one must pursue one’s own plans by
relying on someone else’s good offices, whom one cannot fully supervise, the
other person may pursue his or her own interests at one’s expense;45 difficulties
of supervision also underlie moral hazard in insurance contracts – where the
insured, once the insurance contract is written, behaves less carefully than
promised or demonstrated when the premium was set.46 A different form of
opportunism occurs in hold out behaviour – where a collective project will go
forward only with everyone’s consent, the hold-out suspends his consent in the
hope of securing more than his proportional share of the spoils.47 The
opportunism stems here not from an information (supervision) problem, but from
the monopoly power conferred by the veto.
Though opportunism is frequently mentioned in the economic literature, it is
not easy to find a general definition of it.48 This is probably due to the fact that in
the neoclassic model transactions are supposed to be performed flawlessly. On
that view, only at the bargaining stage, but not during the performance, would
there be room for strategic behaviour.49 By contrast, for the institutionalists in
economics opportunistic behaviour is a central concept at all stages of the
contract. Olivier Williamson, who has done much to bring it in vogue, defines it
as self-interest seeking with guile.50 He opposes opportunism to trust and
                                                 
43 See for instance Mackaay (2000), at 93
44 Buechtemann/Walwei 1999, at 172.
45 Id., at 95-96.
46 Id., at 96.
47 Id., at 94.
48 Cohen (1992), at 954.
49 Parisi 1999, at 31 (n. 13); see also Cooter (1982) at 16-24.
50 Williamson (1975), at 26. This formula is repeated in later work such as Williamson (1985)
and Williamson (1996).
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associates it with selective or misleading disclosure of information and with self-
disbelieved promises regarding one’s future conduct. Lebreton, in a thesis
dealing with opportunism in distribution contracts, adds that ‘opportunistic
conduct manifests itself in incomplete or deceptive disclosure of information, in
efforts to mislead, to distort, to disguise, to put off or to create confusion in
commercial dealings; it shows an evident lack of openness, honesty, loyalty.’51
Opportunism arises where ‘a performing party behaves contrary to the other
party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the
agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party to
the performer.’52 George Cohen defines opportunistic behaviour in general as
‘any contractual conduct by one party contrary to the other party's reasonable
expectations based on the parties' agreement, contractual norms, or
conventional morality.’53 Williamson explains that such behaviour is impossible
where one’s contracting partner has numerous persons to contract with or can
easily switch suppliers. It is precisely small-numbers situations or those where
one must deal with a particular person that open the door to opportunism.
Opportunism can take an infinity of forms. Its variants are coextensive with
opportunities for making profit and (not) sharing it. Each new development in
communication technology – the latest being the internet – brings its lot of new
openings for opportunism. Responses to it develop apace. To accommodate
such an open-ended arsenal of responses to opportunism, law needs a flexible
concept, which is nonetheless compatible with the rule of law. It is our thesis that
good faith is the exact opposite of opportunism.54 To act in good faith is to
abstain from opportunistic acts in circumstances which lend themselves to them.
Opportunism is characterised in law as bad faith, or at least the absence of good
faith.55
We must now look more closely at the specific characteristics of
opportunistic behaviour, which law latches onto to punish bad faith. There are
three elements: the relationship must in some sense be asymmetrical (1); one
party must take advantage of the asymmetry to the detriment of the other (2) and
to a significant degree, that is in excess of a certain threshold of tolerance (3).
                                                 
51 Lebreton (2002), at 4-5 (translation) « [d]e façon générale, ces comportements
[opportunistes] se matérialisent par la divulgation d’informations incomplètes ou dénaturées,
par des efforts calculés pour fourvoyer, dénaturer, déguiser, déconcerter ou semer la
confusion lors de transactions commerciales ; ils recèlent un manque évident de franchise,
d’honnêteté, de loyauté. ».
52 Muris (1981), at 521. Burton (2000) sees the problem of bad faith as the attempt to
recapture opportunities missed during the negotiation leading to the initial contract, but as
Muris argues, this test seems difficult to operationalise. In the older legal scholarship,
Summers (1968) is a key piece for American law.
53 Cohen (1992), at 957.
54 See also Jamet-Legas (2002), Pt II, sct. I, c. I.
55 « The opportunity for bad faith and the duty of good faith go together. There is no need to
impose a legal duty of good faith where there is no opportunity for bad faith. » Bagchi (2003)
at 1886.
Mackaay & Leblanc, The economics of good faith in contract 12
a. Asymmetry
An exchange is worthwhile precisely because of differences in the parties’
assets, talents or valuation. These differences are not themselves a cause for
concern. What we wish to focus on are differences in the information parties hold
going into the contract or again factual or legal situations which make one party
dependent upon the other – a form of monopoly in time or place.56
The information gap may come about in a number of ways. To give some
examples: one party may be an expert at something, the other not; one controls
some outward appearance on which the other must rely; one may be a large
operator with significant scale economies in acquiring or processing information
(for instance, testing complex objects), whereas the other acts as a consumer or
in another small-player capacity; one party may act under serious constraints
due to ‘bounded rationality’57 which are said to distort one’s judgement in such
matters as complex information or small probabilities. The gap may also stem
from one party’s difficulty to supervise performance by the other.
A monopoly in time or place arises where one party must necessarily deal
with the other, whereas the latter has discretionary power as against the former
and is not under a symmetrical dependency. Where the performance of the two
parties under contract is not simultaneous or is spread out in time, the party who
has performed first is at the mercy of the other, who still has to perform. A
different dependency occurs in the case of what Williamson terms asset
specificity58, where one party has undertaken specific investments (or developed
specific skills) which can be used only in the contract with the other and which
become a total loss if the contract is cancelled or not entered into.
Parties have generally incompletely specified their contract. That is they
have not spelt out rules for dealing with unlikely contingencies, on the
assumption that the risk they run this way is less onerous than that of dealing
with them in the contract (including the risk that one’s contracting partner might
get ‘cold feet’ during the protracted negotiations). If one of the contingencies
does occur, good faith would require that parties seek a solution in general
conformity with the balance the original contract struck between them. But one of
the parties may then attempt to turn the ‘gap’ to his or her advantage, by profiting
from the other party’s inattention or by playing hold-out.
A different asymmetry again arises where one party cannot, at affordable
cost considering what is at stake, enforce his rights, whereas the other, being a
repeat player who is a party to numerous similar contracts, can spread the cost
(of creating a reputation for toughness) over all of these.
                                                 
56 Art. 3 of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair terms in consumer
contracts (OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29) speaks of a ‘significant imbalance’. Art 3.11 of the
Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994) uses the term ‘gross
disparity’.
57 Mackaay (2000), at 38 ff. For a first systematic view of what it may entail for law, see
Sunstein (2000); criticised by Posner (2001), ch. 8.
58 Williamson (1985), at 52.
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b. Undue advantage
The asymmetry is not in itself a cause for concern. One deals with
specialists precisely because of their expertise; the asymmetry is the reason for
the contract. Moreover, parties entering into a contract under such
circumstances are aware of the asymmetry and can structure the contract to
provide suitable protection. For instance, where problems of agency may arise
with company directors, one can structure the remuneration package so as to
align the director’s interest with that of the company by making the director part-
owner of the company by means of share options. Again, the director who hides
the true situation of the company when contracting liabilities will be sanctioned
upon a (hostile) take-over and restructuring or by bankruptcy of the company.59
Before entering into an agreement with a contractor one knows only slightly, it is
wise counsel to check solvency, references and earlier dealings; in the course of
the construction, one pays as work progresses and retains a portion of the total
price until the work is fully completed. Trust between the parties, reputation and
other tying factors may also adequately cover the asymmetry.
The problem arises when a party attempts to get a significantly larger piece
of the joint gains of the contract than was envisaged under the initial agreement
or corresponds to normal expectations of the parties. There is then an undue
advantage.60
c. Threshold
Persons knowingly engaging in an asymmetrical relationship which leaves
them open to being exploited will take measures to protect themselves. These
measures are costly and will prevent some other contracts that look otherwise
promising from being concluded. The cost of protecting oneself includes
foregoing some gains from trade.
For buyers and sellers alike, it would therefore seem worthwhile to explore
whether one could improve the trade-off, by lowering the level of self-protection
in exchange for an undertaking by all to abstain from gross forms of
opportunism, backed by a public enforcement mechanism – a social compact.
The – tacit – compact would formalise a certain level of trust amongst citizens. It
would facilitate contracting, all the while leaving everyone in charge of guarding
against the more obvious forms of opportunism, to prevent a moral hazard
problem.
Two analogies present themselves here. The first is with an arms-reduction
treaty between nations. By signing such a treaty, nations abandon a certain level
of armament – ex ante precautionary measures, economists would say, against
surprise attack by others – and replace it with less costly inspection procedures,
                                                 
59 Gomez (1996), at 134, presents a table of forms of opportunism in company management
and the various responses found to counter them.
60 Art. 3.10 of the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994) speaks of
an ‘excessive advantage’. Quoted in Lluelles/Moore 1998, no 907, p. 514.
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leaving open the option, in case of trickery, to rearm – ex post protection.61
Private law offers the second analogy, the protection of private property: owners
restrict self-protective measures in favour of a broad-scale protection of public
order against direct trespass of their property; they continue nonetheless to
ensure themselves part of the protection of their property, by installing fences,
doors with locks, supervision of the boundaries of the property, and so on. Public
order protection may be thought to prevent a lapse into more widespread and
costlier forms of protection by owners themselves62.
In the field that concerns us here, a compact of this sort promises gains in
that contracts can be entered into more easily (with fewer preliminaries and
precautions). But it makes citizens all the more vulnerable to the occasional
crook who ignores it. What would happen if such abuse is left unpunished? The
victim would compare cost of ‘accidents’ such as this with the cost of precautions
that would prevent them but also cut short otherwise worthwhile transactions.
The ‘accident’ cost if composed of the loss suffered as result of being exploited
(as compared to a fair gain which was expected) multiplied by the likelihood of
being victimised (again). What changes here is the perceived value of this
likelihood. Cognitive psychology predicts that individuals are not good at
handling small probabilities and base their assessment on readily recallable
instances (availability heuristic).63 This would suggest that ugly incidents are
likely to provoke a ‘turn over’ of the victim into an over-protective mode.
Moreover, since other individuals use similar simplifying heuristics in judging
whether to protect themselves, information provided by victims is likely to sway
them as well, provoking a veritable cascade.64 In a slightly different context, this
has been referred to as a snowballing effect: leave the first violation unpunished
and soon people will believe that there is no norm, that anything goes.65 The
cascade can be very damaging since it undermines trust in the market and trust,
as has been frequently observed, takes a long time to establish, but can be
destroyed in no time at all.66 In the opposite sense, court decisions visibly
sanctioning opportunistic acts may lower the perceived likelihood of being
victimised.
These considerations suggest a third test for judging whether particular acts
should be sanctioned as bad faith. It would be to ask whether the disadvantage
imposed upon the victim exceeds a threshold which is likely to push the victim
into costly self-protection, and worse, to provoke a cascade of such reactions
amongst others. What the normal expectations of gain in a particular contract
                                                 
61 The success of such treaties has been called into question: Stein (1990), at 130-135;
Downs et al. (1986), at 118-146.
62 Haddock (2003), at 186; McChesney (2003), at 231 f., 235.
63 Tversky/Kahneman (1982).
64 Kuran/Sunstein (1999), (2000).
65 Schelling (1978), ch. 3 (using the example of waste bins in Washington DC warning that
every paper pollutes; the first paper left on the pavement soon leads to the perception that it
is all right to do so, which quickly turns public spaces into waste bins).
66 Nooteboom (2002); Gambetta (1988); Heath (2001) 75.
Mackaay & Leblanc, The economics of good faith in contract 15
should be and what puffing the victims should guard against themselves – hence
the division of roles between public order and private protection – can be read in
customs and practices as well as public documents. The third test is therefore a
threshold of seriousness which must be attained before the law should
intervene.67
The three factors together determine whether good faith is present in a
given situation or not. We should expect them to be applied, even implicitly, in
decisions relying on the concept of good faith, and in the test determining
applicability of concepts derived from good faith. To these we must now turn.
II. TESTS
1. Good faith in case law dealing with international transactions
To see whether these predictions hold in decisions relying on good faith, we
have examined a series of arbitration and judicial decisions dealing with
international transactions. The idea behind this choice is that the decision-
makers, not being bound by national legal systems and the standing legal
literature explaining the concepts in those systems, would apply the notion of
good faith in an unobstructed manner. Moreover, as in international transactions
the contracting parties are based in different legal systems, it would be difficult
for the decision-makers, barring explicit choice by the parties, to rely on one
system’s reading of good faith rather than another; they would be more likely to
seek common sense and good faith foundations for their decisions. The Unidroit
principles, adopted in 1994, direct them to do just that.68
To choose our corpus of decisions, we have examined a series of paper
and electronic publications, where arbitration as well as judicial decisions are
published.69 In these sources, all decisions in which the decision-maker
expressly relied on good faith and cited the Vienna Convention or Unidroit
principles in his reasons for judgement were included. In all, this gave us 36
decisions, 19 by courts, 17 by arbitrators, over the period of 1990 to 2002. Some
decisions were not available in languages which we read; we then relied on
English or French summaries.
                                                 
67 Lluelles/Moore (1998) allude to the idea of such a threshold in no 907, at 513.
68 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994).
69 The list of sources examined is: Revue d’arbitrage (1995-2002) ; UNILEX databaseof
decisions dealing either with the Vienna International Sale of Goods Convention (1980) or
the Unidroit principles of 1994, available at http://www.unilex.info; Revue de droit uniforme,
2000 (case law pertaining to the International Sales Convention) ; lthe Pace University
databse in international law, available at:  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/. We also used a
comkpilation of decisions compiled by Liette Lamonde for Professor Guy Lefebvre
(University of Montreal) in 1997, and dealing with the interprétation of article 7 of Vienna
International Sale of Goods Convention (1980).
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On the whole, the arbitration decisions are less informative than the judicial
decisions; in some cases they merely state that the result conforms to good faith
without giving detailed reasons.
In some instances, the decision states that there is no evidence of bad
faith. Where a painting is sold which, according to information available to both
parties and without further warranties on the subject, is attributed to a well known
painter and, several sales later and after a new expert opinion, it is considered to
be the work of lesser painter, the ultimate purchaser cannot sue the initial
vendor.70 In our terms, there is no asymmetry.
Asymmetric information. Several judicial decisions deal with well-known
fraudulent manoeuvres: turning back the mile counter in cars;71 providing security
which turns out to be inexistent;72 or giving out false letters of credit for the last of
three transactions;73 We are faced here with a problem of asymmetrical
information that one party seeks to exploit at the expense of the other. The
decisions do not deal explicitly with the threshold of seriousness; but in each
case, the fraud is important and bears on the essence of the operation. Other
cases of information asymmetry are one where apparent authority to deal
stemmed from the use of stationery of the person represented,74 and another
where an exclusion of liability clause was part of the standard contract of one
party, but not of the particular document handed to the other party and which had
not otherwise been brought to the latter’s attention.75 The result at which the
court arrives in the first case corresponds to a rule codified in Quebec’s Civil
Code as article 2163 as part of the law of mandate.76
Asymmetry in time. A series of decisions concern asymmetries in time:
once delivery has been made, a non-conformity must be signalled in a brief
period, since delaying it created increasing problems for the vendor.77 By
delaying, the purchaser can then put pressure on the vendor, which he may seek
to turn to his advantage one way or another. To determine what constitutes a
                                                 
70 Kunsthaus Math. Lempertz OHG v. Wilhelmina van der Geld, Arrondissementsrechtbank
Arnhem, Unilex, 17July 1997.
71 Oberlandesgericht Köln, Unilex, no 22 U 4/96, 21 May 1996.
72 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, Unilex, vb/94124, 17 November 1995
73 Dulces Luisi, S.A. de C.V. v. Seoul International Co.Ltd, Seoulia Confectionery Co.,
Compromex, Comision para la Proteccion del Commercio Exterior de Mexico, Unilex, no
m/115/87, 30 November 1998 (arbitration decision).
74 Handelsgericht des Kantons Aargau, Unilex, no OR 98.00010, 11 June 1999.
75 Bundesgerichtshof, Unilex, no VIII ZR 60/01, 31 November 2001.
76 CCQ 2163. A person who has allowed it to be believed that a person was his mandatary is
liable, as if he were his mandatary, to the third person who has contracted in good faith with
the latter, unless, in circumstances in which the error was foreseeable, he has taken
appropriate measures to prevent it.
77 CME Cooperative Maritime Etaploise S.A.C.V. v. Bos-Fishproducts Urk BV. ,
Arrondissementsrechtbank Zwolle, UNILEX, no HA ZA 95-640, 5 March 1997;
Oberlandesgericht, UNILEX, no 1U167/95, 28 February 1997 ; Handelsgericht Zürich,
Unilex, no HG 930634, 30 November 1998.
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reasonable delay, which varies from one trade to the next, one may turn to
customs and practices. In several decisions there is implicit consideration of a
threshold of seriousness. A purchaser who has been given two extensions to pay
and take delivery, and still has not performed, cannot reproach bad faith to the
vendor who cancels the contract: the vendor is considered in good faith – he has
not taken undue advantage of a discretionary power conferred on him by the
contract; implicitly the purchaser is treated as acting in bad faith.78
Asymmetries due to position. In our corpus, two decisions deal with
exclusive distribution contracts in which the grantor, having signed the first,
exclusive, contract, subsequently grants a non-exclusive distribution licence for
the same territory to a third person.79 The relationship obliges parties to deal with
each other exclusively (bilateral monopoly) and the grantor seeks to turn this to
his advantage, to the detriment of the distributor, by granting a second licence.
False reassurances and unfulfilled undertakings to correct. Finally, there is
a range of cases in which circumstances develop in a manner not anticipated in
the contract and which one party seeks to turn to his advantage. Consider for
instance situations where one party asks the other for clarifications and the other
then gives reassurances which turn out to be false80 or undertakes to make
amends, but does not follow through.81 The latter party takes advantage of an
asymmetry he created himself precisely on the occasion when the other took
precautions to prevent it. These situations are similar to those where someone
seeks to exercise a (discretionary) right whilst his earlier behaviour indicated that
he would not do so. A person who grants a extension for delivery cannot
immediately turn round and sue for late delivery. Such behaviour goes against
the principle of clean hands.82
On the whole, our study of the 36 cases dealing with international
transactions leads to two conclusions. One is that the reasons for judgement
given in the decisions deal with the first two of our three tests, but rarely with the
third one, to wit that the acts by which one party seeks to take advantage of the
other must reach a certain level of seriousness for there to be bad faith. Yet the
third test is essential if recourse to good faith is to remain a means of last resort,
as it should, given the broad discretion it confers upon the court.
The second conclusion is that, contrary to our expectations, the absence of
well worked out criteria for interpreting good faith in international dealings, by
                                                 
78 Bielloni Castello S.p.A. v. EGO S.A., Corte di Appello di Milano, 11 December 1998.
79 W. v. R., ICC Court of Arbitration, Paris, Unilex, no 8611/HV/JK, 23 January 1997 ; ICC
International Court of Arbitration, Unilex, no 9875, March 2000.
80 Oberlandesgericht Köln, Unilex, no 27 U 58/95, 8 January 1997 ; Internationales
Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft, Unilex, no SCH-4318, 15
June 1994.
81 Oberlandesgericht Köln, Unilex, no 27 U 58/95, 8 January 1997.
82 CME Cooperative Maritime Etaploise S.A.C.V. v. Bos-Fishproducts Urk BV.,
Arrondissementsrechtbank Zwolle, UNILEX, no HA ZA 95-640, 5 March 1997 ; R. Motor
s.n.c. v. M. Auto Vertriebs GmbH, Unilex, no 7 U 1720/94, 8 February 1995.
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contrast to what is available within national legal systems is a source of
hesitation for the decision makers. Hence it would seem worthwhile to pursue
these investigations within national legal systems. We now look at some
concepts considered to be derivates of good faith within national systems.
2. Analysis of three concepts derived from good faith
If good faith has been the mould used to fashion a series of more specific
concepts,83 which have subsequently started to lead a life of their own, we may
expect that in the criteria for the application of these concepts as synthesised by
the legal literature and the cases, we should find back the three general
characteristics of good faith which postulated earlier in this paper. The number of
derivative concepts is considerable. Whittaker and Zimmerman provide the
following list for civilian systems:
‘They include, as regards the civilian jurisdictions, and apart from special
legislation: culpa in contrahendo; obligations d'information; laesio enormis; the
abuse of rights; personal bar; interpretation of the parties' intentions (whether
standard or 'supplementary'); the doctrine of 'lawful contact'; laches;
unconscionability; Verwirkung; purgatio morae and purgatio poenae; doctrines of
change of circumstances or 'erroneous presuppositions'; the notion of a 'burden'
(Obliegenheit); force majeure; exceptio doli; mutual mistake; liability for latent
defects; the legal consequences associated with the maxims nemo auditor
turpitudinem suam allegans and dolo agit qui petit quod statim redditurus est;
and venire contra factum proprium.’84
For common law jurisdictions, they add:
‘The range of doctrines (…), again apart from special legislation, is hardly
less varied, reference being made to: the law of implied terms; the doctrine of
estoppel (including proprietary estoppel); part performance of a contract in
equity; the de minimis rule; qualifications of legal rights by reference to the notion
of reasonableness; relief against forfeiture in equity; the maxim according to
which 'no man can take advantage of his own wrong': the notion of breach of
confidence; the doctrine of fundamental mistake; the law relating to repudiation;
and (occasionally) even a rule that a contractual power may only be exercised in
good faith.’85
In what follows we examine three derivative concepts in more detail, to wit
fraud as a defect of consent, the warranty against latent defects and lesion.
a. Fraud as a defect of consent
Fraud, or dol in French, is used for acts aimed at misleading someone into
contracting while mistaken about the import of the contract.86 The concept
includes the idea of tricks, deception, scheming and other fraudulent or disloyal
                                                 
83 Cordeiro (1996), at 223, 234 et 240.
84 Whittaker/Zimmerman (2000), at 676; also Zimmerman 2001, 172.
85 Ibid.
86 Karim (2002) at 187; Flour/Aubert/Savaux (2002) at 149.
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tactics with a view to misleadingly securing consent of the other party. Various
commentators have observed that the concept is a specification of the good faith
norm and of the duty to inform, which it presupposes. 87
i. Asymmetry
At the core of the concept of fraud is the intention to deceive, that is to
withhold from the other party information relevant for its consent. It may be
accomplished by positive acts, such as lies or a fraudulent scheme, but also by
omission, silence or failure to correct mistaken views. It is intimately interwoven
with the duty to inform, which is recognised in various areas of the law of
contract.
Positive acts and omissions form a continuum of conduct which limits
information available to one contracting party so as to procure to the other an
advantage in excess of what would be normally foreseeable. We are clearly
facing an informational asymmetry here.
In assessing whether fraud has been committed, it is generally accepted
that one has to take into account the identity and character of each of the parties,
considering their authority, their expertise, their age and their level of
education.88
ii. Undue advantage
The criterion used in civil law systems is that the victim of the fraud would
not have contracted or have contracted at more advantageous conditions. The
victim is considered to be placed at an unforeseen disadvantage by comparison
to the gains the parties could normally expect to draw from a similar contract.
This appears to correspond to our criterion.
iii. Threshold
To be actionable, the fraud must be decisive; this is the case where the
victim would not have contracted or have contracted at more advantageous
terms. This test does double duty: it determines whether the perpetrator of the
fraud has put the victim at a disadvantage and whether the disadvantage is
important enough to have made a difference in the victim’s behaviour. If victims
are forced to live with a contract they would not have signed had they been
properly informed, they will in the future change their behaviour so as to be on
guard for such schemes (self-protection). This raises the cost of doing business,
but for minor attempts at deception, self-protection is probably cheaper than
public protection through the courts; for significant ones, the reverse holds. The
idea of a threshold separates the two sectors.
Civilian systems capture some of this difference in the distinction between
bonus dolus – malus dolus. Puffing in a effort to sell one’s goods belongs to the
                                                 
87 Karim (2002) at 187; Delebecque (1999) at 58.
88 Terré et al. (1999) at 215; Karim (2000) at 192; Pineau et al. (2001) at 181.
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first variety.89 Parties are supposed to be able to cope with this by themselves.
This guards against an all too simplistic or naïve confidence and encourages all
contracting parties to undertake the most elementary checking themselves.90
The distinction between what is fraud and what is acceptable exaggeration
corresponds to the duty to inform incumbent on the better informed party and the
duty to inquire and otherwise inform oneself for the potential victim. The
boundary is considered to be set by the behaviour of a normally diligent91 buyer.
This criterion may be related to usage and practices prevailing within the relevant
community.92 One may surmise that experience, reflected in custom and
practices, has led to the best division of tasks between self-protection and
protection by the law.
b. Warranty for latent defects in sale
The liability for latent defects seeks to ensure useful possession of the
object sold to the buyer. Wherever the object has defects making it unfit for the
purpose for which it is normally used and those defects cannot be detected by
ordinary means at the time of purchase, the vendor or manufacturer is liable. The
warranty does not cover apparent defects, i.e. those detectable by ordinary
means, which in current Quebec law means inspection by a ‘prudent and diligent’
purchaser, without resorting to an expert.93
Two different logics are at work in this concept. Where the vendor or
manufacturer is aware of the defect but does not – adequately – inform the
purchaser of it, we are faced with a problem of opportunism, hence of bad faith,
which is topic of this paper. In the opposite case, one may wonder whether the
vendor or manufacturer could have detected and corrected the defect at a cost
below the discounted loss the defect causes to the purchaser, in which case
ordinary negligence logic – barring contractual stipulations to the contrary –
commands that he should be liable for it. The vendor or manufacturer is the
                                                 
89 Pineau et al. (2001), at 179-180, write: ‘[N]’est “répréhensible” que le mensonge qui
présente une certaine gravité et non point le “menu mensonge”, pain quotidien des
contractants! [...] Le “pieux mensonge”, les exagérations généralement admises dans les
affaires lorsqu’il s’agit de vanter sa marchandise, ne constituent pas un dol’.
90 Terré et al. (1999) at 215, write that parties should ‘ne pas faire montre d’une trop grande
naïveté à l’égard des affirmations de son partenaire et à procéder à un minimum de
vérifications’.
91 Art. 1725 (and others) CCQ use the term ‘prudent and diligent buyer’. (1725. The seller of
an immovable is warrantor towards the buyer for any violation of restrictions of public law
affecting the property which are exceptions to the ordinary law of ownership).
92 Pineau et al. (2001), at 180; Delebecque (1999) at 59.
93 1726, par. 2 CCQ (The seller is bound to warrant the buyer that the property and its
accessories are, at the time of the sale, free of latent defects which render it unfit for the use
for which it was intended or which so diminish its usefulness that the buyer would not have
bought it or paid so high a price if he had been aware of them.
The seller is not bound, however, to warrant against any latent defect known to the buyer or
any apparent defect; an apparent defect is a defect that can be perceived by a prudent and
diligent buyer without any need of expert assistance.)
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‘cheapest cost avoider’.94 The cost of the liability, and hence of the preventive
measures the manufacturer puts in place, is passed on to the consumer as a
higher price for a better quality product. If the defect cannot be so detected and
corrected, and hence is economically ‘unpreventable’, the vendor or
manufacturer acts as a loss spreader – an insurer by another name – for all
clients, who pay for this ‘insurance’ in the purchase price of the object. The
manufacturer then still has an incentive to engage in research which in the future
will improve the quality of the product and hence reduce the cost of the implicit
‘insurance premium’.
The warranty goes back to Roman law.95 This explains perhaps why
amongst its sanctions one does not find the option to repair or correct the defect.
In Roman times, Zimmermann surmises, defective objects such as animals or
slaves could scarcely be repaired.96 Modern case law and scholarship has added
the requirement that vendor must be allowed to attempt a repair before facing
the resolution of the sale, with full restitution of the price, or a reduction in price.
A second peculiarity of warranty for latent defects in civil law systems is that
liability for damage arises only where the vendor or manufacturer had actual or
presumed knowledge of the defect. Actual knowledge without disclosure of the
relevant information amounts to fraud, which is our topic here. For presumed
knowledge, even though the civil law equates it to a form of dol, the explanation
must be different and lie in the second or third of the three logics (cheapest cost
avoider, cheaper insurer, incentives for research) mentioned earlier. In the case
of manufacturers, actual knowledge may be difficult to prove. By means of
various presumptions, of knowledge97 but also of defectiveness in case of
premature deterioration98, the Code helps buyers to prove their case, a form of
reduction of transactions costs.99
Even where the vendor had no actual knowledge of the defect, he still faces
the prospect of having to take back the product and restore the purchase price to
the buyer. The explanation must be that the vendor now has an incentive to
                                                 
94 The term was proposed by Calabresi (1970) at 139, 150, 244.
95 Zimmermann (2001), at 122.
96 Ibid.
97 In Quebec law, 1728 and 1730 CCQ. (1728. If the seller was aware or could not have been
unaware of the latent defect, he is bound not only to restore the price, but to pay all
damages suffered by the buyer. 1730. The manufacturer, any person who distributes the
property under his name or as his own, and any supplier of the property, in particular the
wholesaler and the importer, are also bound to warrant the buyer in the same manner as the
seller.)
98 In Quebec law, 1729 CCQ. (A defect is presumed to have existed at the time of a sale by a
professional seller if the property malfunctions or deteriorates prematurely in comparison
with identical items of property or items of the same type; such a presumption is not made,
however, where the defect is due to improper use of the property by the buyer.)
99 Proving one’s case against a mass manufacturer is no trivial matter as is readily seen in, for
instance, the suit against Ford regarding the defective design of the Pinto. See Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3rd 757, at 800; 174 Cal. Reptr. 348 (1981); comment by
Schwartz (1991) and Page (2002) at 810 f.
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discover latent defects in objects he uses and is better placed to discover them
than is the prospective purchaser.
i. Asymmetry
What interests us here are cases of actual knowledge of a defect without
disclosure of the relevant information to the purchaser. This amounts to an
asymmetry of information. Only latent defects are actionable, not apparent ones.
This is immediately explicable from an economic point of view since what the
purchaser is properly appraised of can scarcely be used for opportunistic moves.
There is no asymmetry here.
By extension, the obligation to warrant holds for the manufacturer of mass-
produced objects, who is well placed to know the chance of defects, at least in a
statistical sense, by conducting the appropriate quality control tests. There is a
asymmetry here with respect to the purchaser of individual objects of the mass-
produced series. Between two professionals, both operating as large-scale
purchasers and sellers, the asymmetry does not arise: the professional
purchaser is more easily aware of and better able to cope with individual defects
that is the consumer-purchaser. The law recognises this by attaching a lower
level of liability to such relationships.
ii. Undue advantage
This factor is assessed by giving the buyer three options: leave the sale
undisturbed (presumably no disadvantage to the buyer); quanti minoris
(reduction of price, i.e. a judicially assessed compensation for the disadvantage);
nullity of the sale, each party recovering what it had tendered (this restores
subjective value to each, except for the time spent in locating a good purchase).
The warranty becomes actionable where either the object sold is unfit for its
normal purpose or is unsuitable for a specially agreed (different) purpose. This
limitation reigns in a moral hazard (opportunism, hence bad faith) problem with
buyers being too freely able to return what they bought or to return the object
after misusing it.100 Sellers may of course contractually grant such return
privileges for a limited time, thereby allowing purchasers to judge whether the
purchase is fair. Where the option is not exercised, the purchaser presumably
sees no undue advantage.
iii. Threshold
Case law has determined that latent defects must be of a certain
seriousness to be actionable. What this amounts to is somewhat fuzzy, but the
test which for instance the Quebec Civil Code proposes, in art. 1726, reminds us
of one we already encountered with respect to fraud: ‘The seller is bound to
warrant the buyer that the property and its accessories are, at the time of the
sale, free of latent defects which render it unfit for the use for which it was
                                                 
100 In Quebec law, 1729, second sentence CCQ.
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intended or which so diminish its usefulness that the buyer would not have
bought it or paid so high a price if he had been aware of them.’101
Only latent defects are actionable, not apparent ones. One might think of
defects on a sliding scale of seriousness: to one side the apparent deficiencies;
as one moves along the scale, the less obvious ones until at the other end of the
scale one reaches defects that are totally hidden and will only discovered after a
lot of experience. The latent character of the defect acts as a further element of
the threshold.
c. Lesion
In civilian systems, the concept of lesion or leasio enormis is perhaps bad
faith in its least adulterated form. Civilian scholarship defines it as ‘a loss a
contracting party suffers as a result of the lack of equivalence between the
advantage acquired and what is given up in return for it’;102 or again as ‘a
disequilibrium at the time of entering into the contract between the prestations
reciprocally agreed to’.103 In all civilian systems, lesion can only be invoked
exceptionally. In Quebec law, for instance, it is applicable as regards minors and
adults under a protective regime104, in consumer contracts105 and in a few
particular sets of circumstances.106
                                                 
101 1726 CCQ, italics added. The formula for fraud, in art. 1401, par. 1, is : Error on the part of
one party induced by fraud committed by the other party or with his knowledge vitiates
consent whenever, but for that error, the party would not have contracted, or would have
contracted on different terms.
102 Flour et al. (2002) at 168-169 (préjudice que subit une partie contractante à raison d’un
défaut d’équivalence entre l’avantage qu’elle obtient et le sacrifice qu’elle consent).
103 Pineau et al. (2001) at 208 (un état de déséquilibre existant au moment de la conclusion du
contrat entre les prestations réciproquement stipulées).
104 Art. 1405 CCQ. (Except in the cases expressly provided by law, lesion vitiates consent only
in respect of minors and persons of full age under protective supervision.)
105 In Quebec law, art. 8 and 9 of the Consumer Protection Act, Revised Statutes of Quebec,
ch. P 40.1.
Art. 8. The consumer may demand the nullity of a contract or a reduction in his obligations
thereunder where the disproportion between the respective obligations of the parties is so
great as to amount to exploitation of the consumer or where the obligation of the consumer
is excessive, harsh or unconscionable.
Art. 9. Where the court must determine whether a consumer consented to a contract, it shall
consider the condition of the parties, the circumstances in which the contract was entered
into and the benefits arising from the contract for the consumer.
106 Artt. 424, 472, 1609, 2332 CCQ. (424. Renunciation by one of the spouses, by notarial act,
of partition of the family patrimony may be annulled by reason of lesion or any other cause
of nullity of contracts.
472. Acceptance and renunciation are irrevocable. Renunciation may be annulled, however,
by reason of lesion or any other cause of nullity of contracts.
1609. An acquittance, transaction or statement obtained from the creditor in connection with
bodily or moral injury he has sustained, obtained by the debtor, an insurer or their
representatives within thirty days of the act which caused the injury, is without effect if it is
damaging to the creditor.
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i. Asymmetry
The cases where lesion can be invoked have a point in common, to wit that
one party may be considered to be in a weak bargaining position in relation to
the other. The asymmetry may pertain to information, to expertise or to the scale
at which he or she operates (economic power), as in consumer-merchant
dealings, the consumer being a ‘small-scale’ operator in such dealings.107
The asymmetry may stem from one party’s presumed inability to appraise
the full consequences of his or her decisions, due to inexperience (minors) or
limited mental capacity (adults in a protective regime). The few special cases
where the Quebec Code admits lesion similarly denote a presumed vulnerability
of one of the parties: stress of divorce (424 and 472 CCQ) or physical injury
(1609 CCQ). The case of an excessively onerous loan (2332 CCQ) stands
somewhat apart but also refers to situations where the debtor presumably
contracted under stress without fully realising that he was being taken advantage
off. Of course, making such loans avoidable will make it harder for poor debtors
to find loans.
ii. Undue advantage
The very definition of lesion stresses this factor, as in article 1406 of the
Quebec Code, for instance,
Lesion results from the exploitation of one of the parties by the other,
which creates a serious disproportion between the prestations of the
parties; the fact that there is a serious disproportion creates a
presumption of exploitation.
How to distinguish a respectable but hefty profit for one party from one that
is gained at the expense of the other party whose vulnerability is exploited?
Values of what one gains from a contract are essentially subjective. Parties
engage in a exchange precisely because they do not value the exchanged
objects or services and sums of money in the same way. It is touchy for a court
to second-guess the persons directly concerned on the ‘equivalence’ of the
prestations, hence to assess the fairness of the deal. It is equally tricky to detect
abuse in the behaviour of commercial operators seeking a profit.
Quite sensibly, the Code accommodates these concerns by making
transactions avoidable for lesion at the pleasure of the disadvantaged party, but
with the option of maintaining it with a reduction in the price. The discretion
offered here to the presumably disadvantaged party opens the door to
opportunism on his or her part. To counter this risk, the Quebec Civil Code
                                                                                                                                                  
2332. In the case of a loan of a sum of money, the court may pronounce the nullity of the
contract, order the reduction of the obligations arising from the contract or revise the terms
and conditions of the performance of the obligations to the extent that it finds that, having
regard to the risk and to all the circumstances, one of the parties has suffered lesion.).
107 As Pineau et al. (2001) at 218 put it : ‘situation de faiblesse, d’inexpérience ou de gêne de
l’autre’.
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provides that the court may maintain the contract in spite of the demand for its
nullity, where the other offers an equitable corrective.108
All in all, our second test appears to be clearly present amongst the
conditions for the applicability of the concept of lesion.
iii. Threshold
In the provisions dealing with lesion in Quebec law, the idea of a threshold
is close to the surface. Article 1406 of the Quebec Civil Code refers to a ‘serious
disproportion’ and article 8 of the Consumer Protection Act to [a disproportion] so
great as to amount to exploitation of the consumer’.
In French law, specific numbers are sometimes spelt out for the
disproportion to be actionable, for instance, in flat-fee contracts for copyright
exploitation109 and in the sale of immoveable property.110 But the application of
these provisions is cumbersome, to put it mildly. The Code itself provides, for
immoveable property, that the disadvantage has to be for seven twelfths of the
value and that the value is to be assessed by three independent experts
appointed by the court, or by agreement between the parties.
All in all, the provisions defining lesion appear to contain elements referring
to our three tests: an asymmetry which one party turns to its (undue) advantage
at the expense of the other, with sufficient seriousness to imperil the normal
functioning of markets with the implicit division of self-protection and public
protection that it presupposes. At the same time, they show the practical difficulty
of specifying a threshold for judicial intervention sufficiently restrictive to maintain
the stability of contract, which is also an essential condition for properly
functioning markets.
CONCLUSION
Good faith is an old and yet intractable notion, in civil law as well as in
common law jurisdictions and in international commercial law. In civil law
systems its role has been strengthened in recent codifications. It remains,
however, an ill-understood concept. To clarify it, legal scholarship draws on
intuition and uses terms such honesty and loyalty, which are more or less
synonymous and equally open-ended.
                                                 
108 Art. 1407 and 1408 CCQ. (1407. A person whose consent is vitiated has the right to apply
for annulment of the contract; in the case of error occasioned by fraud, of fear or of lesion,
he may, in addition to annulment, also claim damages or, where he prefers that the contract
be maintained, apply for a reduction of his obligation equivalent to the damages he would be
justified in claiming. 1408. In the case of a demand for the annulment of a contract on the
ground of lesion, the court may maintain the contract where the defendant offers a reduction
of his claim or an equitable pecuniary supplement.).
109 Art. L. 131-5, Code la propriété intellectuelle (lesion for 7/12 of the value). See Lucas/Lucas
(2001), no 539, at 435 f.
110 Art. 1674 of the French Civil Code (lesion for 7/12 of the value). See Carbonnier (1996) no
78, at 146.
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Good faith appears to be an open-ended concept or principle rather than a
specific rule. It has been the mould in which have been fashioned a range of
more specific concepts that have started to lead a life of their own in case law
and legal scholarship. At first blush, good faith seems bound to continue its role
as an open-ended instrument of last resort and allowing considerable discretion
to the courts, to sanction highly undesirable acts for which no more specific rules
are available.
This article has explored what the economic analysis of law has to offer by
way of clarification of the concept of good faith. In an economic analysis, the law
of contracts appears to have to broad functions: to reduce transactions costs and
to curtail opportunism. Good faith, or rather its absence, is linked to the second
function. Good faith is the exact opposite of opportunism.
While the term opportunism appears regularly in economic discourse, it is
as hard to find a good definition of it there as it is to find one of good faith in the
legal literature. Both appear to be used in a fuzzy manner to refer to behaviour
contrary to the cooperative solution in bilateral and multilateral relationships. The
most appropriate formula to describe it in our view has been put forth by George
Cohen. It is worth repeating it here: ‘any contractual conduct by one party
contrary to the other party's reasonable expectations based on the parties'
agreement, contractual norms, or conventional morality.’111
To operationalise the concept, we have proposed a three-step test, which
are themselves relatively open-ended: an asymmetry between the parties; which
one of them seeks to exploit to the detriment of the other in order to draw an
undue advantage from it; the exploitation being sufficiently serious that, in the
absence of a sanction, the victim and others like him or her are likely
substantially to increase measures of self-protection before entering into a
contract in the future, thereby reducing the overall level of contracting.
If this is accurate, one should be able to trace, even implicitly, the three
factors in reasons for judgement in decisions relying on good faith and in
concepts considered to be emanations of good faith. We looked at a set of
decisions in international commercial law and at the concepts of fraud (dol) in
contract, warranty against latent defects and lesion by way of an informal test.
The general conclusion is that the first two concepts are usually easy to trace,
the third one with more difficulty. It would be useful to repeat the test on a more
diversified corpus.
At a normative level, if our three factors are accepted as appropriately
characterising good faith, one would have to look for them amongst the facts
giving rise to legal disputes. It is for the legal community to decide whether that
clarifies the concept of good faith.
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